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Abstract
This paper presents a model of an urban area with local income taxes
used to finance a local public good. Households differ in both incomes
and their taste for housing. The existence of an asymetric equilibrium is
shown in a calibrated two-community model assuming single-peaked distri-
butions for income and housing taste. The equilibrium features segregation
of households by both incomes and tastes. The high-tax community shows
lower housing prices and lower public good provision than the low-tax
community. The model is able to explain the substantial differences in
local income tax level and average income across communities as observed
in, e.g., Switzerland. The numerical investigation suggests that taste het-
erogeneity reduces the distributional effects of local tax differences. The
numerical investigation also suggests that the ability of the rich commu-
nity to set low taxes is higher when this community is physically small.
However, a tax haven need not be small.
Key Words : Segregation, Fiscal Federalism, Income Taxation, Local Public
Goods
JEL-classification: H71, H73, R13
∗The term ‘stratification’ has been replaced by ‘segregation’ in the course of revision.
†Kurt Schmidheiny, University of Bern, Department of Economics, Gesellschaftstrasse 49,
3012 Bern, Tel.: 0041 31 631 47 75, Email: schmidheiny@vwi.unibe.ch.
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1 Introduction
Decentralized decision making at appropriate levels of government is in many
countries viewed as an essential factor for good government. In some countries
the federal system involves a decentralized fiscal structure. In the United States,
for example, the central government raises progressive income taxes while the
individual states collect retail sales taxes and many communities are financed by
property taxes. Fiscal Federalism has recently been intensively debated in the
European Union. On the one hand there are attempts to coordinate fiscal policies
across EU member states. On the other, increased regional self-government, as
implied by the subsidiarity principle, calls for some regional fiscal autonomy.
Oates (1972) argues that local units deciding upon public programs are more
likely to trade off costs against benefits if these programs are financed by local
taxes.
The formal framework for the study of local provision of local public goods
originates in Tiebout’s (1956) seminal work. Tiebout showed that fiscal decen-
tralization leads to an efficient provision of local public goods because people with
similar preferences would settle in a particular location and vote for their desired
level of public goods provision. Tiebout’s result rests heavily on the assumption
that households have equal incomes. When households differ in incomes, this
result may no longer hold. In this situation it is advantageous for high-income
households to locate with other high-income households and hence reduce their
tax burden. Furthermore, low-income households may also prefer to locate with
high-income households to benefit from their large tax base. So, while the rich
try to gather in a rich community, the poor may seek to follow and hence leave
an ever smaller and poorer community. However, as the literature outlined in the
next paragraph has shown, this ‘race to the bottom’ need not take place. The
paper extends this finding to local income taxation.
Following Tiebout, there is a long tradition of modelling fiscal decentralization
at community level. The consideration of heterogeneous household income by
Ellickson (1971) and Westhoff (1977) moved the focus away from seeking optimal
community size to the study of urban areas with given community borders. While
this strand of literature was followed by a large number of studies investigating
local property taxation (surveyed in Ross and Yinger 1999), there have been few
contributions on local taxation of income (e.g. Hansen and Kessler 2001a).
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Multi-community models with heterogeneous agents predict a segregation of
the population by income, i.e. households of the same income group live in the
same community. While differences of average income across local jurisdictions
are typically observed, perfect segregation of income groups is not an empiri-
cal phenomenon. This incomplete income segregation of the population may be
attributed to heterogeneous tastes for public goods and housing or to a certain
preference for a particular place. Epple and Platt (1998) study a model with prop-
erty taxation and show that the introduction of heterogeneous taste for housing
indeed predicts a more realistic incomplete segregation of the population. Epple
and Sieg (1999) test the predicted income segregation and show that it is able to
explain the differences of income distributions across communities in the Boston
metropolitan area.
This paper follows Epple and Platt (1998) but introduces heterogeneous tastes
in a multi-community model with local income taxation and a partly substitutable
public good. The income taxation model has been investigated by Goodspeed
(1989). This study generalizes Goodspeed’s analysis both by introducing hetero-
geneous tastes and by using a realistic single-peaked distribution of the popula-
tion. Not only does this single-peakedness capture a realistic feature of urban
economies, but it also challenges the existence of equilibria in multi-community
models with income taxation. The possible non-existence of segregated equilibria
in a model with local income taxation is shown by Hansen and Kessler (2001b).
Switzerland is an exemplary case of a federal fiscal system. Switzerland is
a federation of 26 states, the so-called cantons. The cantons are divided into
individual communities of varying size and population. The roughly 3000 com-
munities form individual jurisdictions with great autonomy in terms of providing
local public goods such as school services or infrastructure. The unique situation
in Switzerland is that the communities finance their expenditures mainly by lo-
cal income taxes. While cantons autonomously organize the whole tax system,
e.g. the degree of tax progression or the split between income and corporate
taxes, the communities can generally only set a tax shifter in a given cantonal
tax scheme. There is considerable variation in income taxes across Swiss com-
munities. For example, for a two-child family with a gross income of 100,000
Swiss francs (CHF) the sum of cantonal and community income tax ranged from
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Share of commuters to Local income tax shifter (1997)
center community (1990)
0.76
0.59
0.46
0.33
131.00
125.58
101.00
85.98
85.00
Share of households with income Rental price for housing,
above CHF 75’000 (1997/98) CHF per annum and m2 (1997)
0.56
0.52
0.40
0.28
0.25
268.41
257.20
215.85
190.56
181.33
Figure 1: Community characteristics in the metropolitan area of Zurich.2
CHF 3,500 (city of Zug) to CHF 14,500 (city of Neuchaˆtel) in the year 2001.1
Within metropolitan areas the (community) tax differences are smaller but may
still differ by a factor of up to 1.5 in the Zurich area for example. Figure 1 shows
the substantial differences in local tax levels, income and housing prices across
this community system.2 The bottom-left map visualizes the considerable segre-
gation by incomes in the Zurich area. The top-right and the bottom-left maps
demonstrate a striking relationship between income taxation and spatial income
1Taken into consideration are the tax rates of the cantonal capitals. Some smaller commu-
nities show even higher respectively lower tax rates.
2Data from the following sources: Commuter: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, Census 1990.
Tax rates: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Zu¨rich, Steuerfu¨sse 1997. Income distribution: Swiss
Federal Tax Administration. Housing prices: Wu¨est und Partner, Zurich. Considered are
all communities where more than 1/3 of the working population is commuting to the center
community.
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distribution: the local share of rich households is almost an inverted picture of
the local tax levels. It is particularly interesting to see whether multi-community
models are able to explain the observed tax differentials.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the formal model and
derives the properties of the household utility function that induce segregation
of the population. In the first part of Section 3 the calibration used for the
numerical investigation of the equilibrium is described. In the second part of
Section 3 the numerical equilibrium is presented and the welfare implications of
the decentralized decision making are discussed. Section 4 draws conclusions.
2 The Model
The model economy is divided into J distinct communities. The area is popu-
lated by a continuum of heterogeneous households, which differ in both income
y ∈ [y, y], 0 < y, y < ∞, and a parameter α ∈ [0, 1] describing their taste for
housing. Income and taste are jointly distributed according to the density func-
tion f(y, α) > 0. There are three goods in the economy: private consumption b,
housing h and a local publicly provided good g.3 The latter is local in the sense
that it is only consumed by the residents of a community.
A household can move costlessly and chooses the community in which its
utility is maximized as place of residence. Each community indexed by j can
individually set the amount of the local public good gj and the local income
tax rate tj ∈ [0, 1]. These decisions are made in a majority rule vote by the
residents respecting budget balance in the community. Each community has a
fixed amount of land Lj from which housing stock is produced. All households
are renters and the housing stock is owned by an absentee landlord. The price for
housing pj in community j is determined in a competitive housing market. The
private good is considered as numeraire. A community j is fully characterised by
the triple (tj, pj, gj). The set of all possible community characteristics is given by
Γ = [0, 1]× IR++ × IR+.
Location choice and voting are examined in a two-stage game. In the first
stage, households choose their place of residence. In the second stage the inhabi-
tants of a community vote for the level of public good provision and consequently
3See Section 2.4 for a discussion of the nature of the public good.
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for the community tax rate. The model is solved using backward induction.
2.1 Households
The preferences of the households are described by a Stone-Geary utility function
U(h, b, g;α) := α ln(h− βh) + (1− α) ln(b− βb) + γ ln(g − βg) ,
where h is the consumption of housing, b the consumption of the private good and
g the consumption of the publicly provided good. βh > 0, βb > 0 and βg > 0 are
sometimes referred to as existential needs for housing, private good and public
good, respectively. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] describes the households’ taste for
housing, as will become apparent below.
Households face a budget constraint:
ph+ b ≤ y(1− t) ,
where p is the price of housing and t the local income tax. Note that the price of
the private good is set to unity. Maximisation of the utility function with respect
to h and b subject to the budget constraint yields the housing demand function
h∗ := h(t, p, g; y, α) =
α[y(1− t)− pβh − βb]
p
+ βh
and the demand for the the private good b∗ = y(1 − t) − ph∗. Both demand
functions are linear functions of after-tax income y(1 − t), reflecting the fact
that a linear demand system implies a Stone-Geary utility function and vice-
versa (see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). Housing demand is increasing in α as
long as the household can satisfy its existential needs, i.e. ∂(h)/∂(α) > 0 iff
y(1 − t) > pβh + βb > 0. α = 0 implies that the housing demand is equal to
the existential needs and hence does not change with household income. α = 1
denotes a household which spends all extra income on housing after paying his
existential need. The income elasticity of housing
ε :=
∂h∗
∂y(1− t)
y(1− t)
h∗
S 1 iff α S pβh
pβh + βb
depends on the housing price and is smaller or bigger than 1 depending on the
household’s tastes α (see the Appendix).
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The indirect utility
V (t, p, g; y, α) := U(h∗, b∗, g;α)
gives the utility of a household with income y and preference parameter α in a
community with income tax t, housing prices p and a public good provision g.
The following properties of the indirect utility function determine the distri-
bution of households across communities. Properties 1 to 3 are directly derived
from this indirect utility function assuming that existential needs are strictly sat-
isfied, i.e. y(1− t) > pβh + βb > 0 and g > βg. The calculations are provided in
the Appendix.
Property 1 (Relative preferences)
For all (t, p, g, y, α) ∈ Γ× IR+ × [0, 1]
Mg,t(t, p, g, y, α) :=
dg
dt
∣∣∣∣
dV=0,dp=0
> 0 ,
Mg,p(t, p, g, y, α) :=
dg
dp
∣∣∣∣
dV=0,dt=0
> 0 ,
Mt,p(t, p, g, y, α) :=
dt
dp
∣∣∣∣
dV=0,dg=0
< 0 .
Property 1 defines and signs the marginal rate of substitution M.,. between two
community characteristics. Property 1 states that a household can be compen-
sated for a tax increase either by more public good provision or by lower housing
prices. Westhoff (1977) calls this trade-off the relative preference for the public
good. Property 1 also states that a household can be made indifferent to higher
housing prices if it is compensated by more public good provision. Property 1
holds under the standard assumption about the influence of prices, taxes and
public goods on the household’s well-being and is not specific to the assumed
utility function.
Property 2 (Monotonicity of relative preferences)
(a) For all (t, p, g, y) ∈ Γ× IR+ and any α ∈ [0, 1],
∂Mg,t
∂y
< 0 and
∂Mg,p
∂y
< 0 .
(b) For all (t, p, g, α) ∈ Γ× [0, 1] and any y ∈ IR+,
∂Mg,p
∂α
> 0 and
∂Mt,p
∂α
< 0 .
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Property 2 states that the relative preference for community characteristics changes
monotonically with both income and taste. This property is equivalent to the
Spence-Mirrless condition in information economics. It implies that a rich house-
hold can be compensated for a tax increase by strictly less public goods than
a poor household. The compensation for higher housing prices by public goods
decreases with income and increases with housing taste. The marginal rate of
substitution between tax and housing price falls with housing taste.4 Property 2
is a consequence of the changing weight of housing in the household’s budget with
income and taste. Note that Property 2 therefore does not hold for homothetic
preferences.5
Property 3 (Proportional shift of relative preferences)
(a) For all (t, p, g, y) ∈ Γ× IR+ and any given α ∈ [0, 1], both
∂Mg,p
∂y
/
∂Mg,t
∂y
and
∂Mt,p
∂y
/
∂Mt,g
∂y
are independent of y, where Mt,g = 1/Mg,t.
(b) For all (t, p, g, α) ∈ Γ× [0, 1] and any given y ∈ IR+,
∂Mg,t
∂α
= 0 .
Property 3 results from the linear demand system in combination with the addi-
tive separability between g and (h, b). Although very specific, Property 3 is an
indispensable condition to get segregation of the population.6
4The marginal rate of substitution between tax and housing price decreases with income if
ε > 1 and increases if ε < 1.
5The property ∂Mg,t/∂y < 0 is shared with Goodspeed (1986, 1989), who shows that it
is equivalent to εg,y/εg,p > 1, where εg,y is the income elasticity and εg,pg is the (shadow)
price elasticity of demand for the public good. ∂Mg,p/∂y < 0 is shared with Ellikson (1971),
Westhoff (1977), Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984, 1993) and Goodspeed (1986, 1989). Good-
speed reformulates this assumption as εg,y/εg,p > εh,y, where εh,y is the income elasticity of
demand for housing. He also points to empirical evidence that shows that both assumptions
are reasonable. Property 2b shows preference heterogeneity in the same spirit as Epple and
Platt (1998).
6It seems difficult to justify either Property 3a or Property 3b empirically. Schmidheiny
(2002) shows that Property 3 is a necessairy condition for perfect income segregation. Good-
speed seems to derive income segregation without Property 3 in the same setting. However,
the graphical proof he provides in Goodspeed (1986) is incomplete. Goodspeed (1989) uses the
Stone-Geary utility function for the numerical simulation.
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2.2 Location Choice
A household chooses to locate in the community in which its utility is maximal.
Defining Vj(y, α) := V (tj, pj, gj; y, α) as the household’s utility in j, a household
chooses j if and only if
Vj(y, α) ≥ Vi(y, α) for all i . (1)
The distribution of the households across communities implied by Properties 2
and 3 is described in the following paragraphs. A first observation is that all
households are indifferent between all communities when the communities have
identical community characteristics, i.e. (ti, pi) = (tj, pj) for all j, i. In this case
the households settle such that all communities show the same income distribu-
tion. In addition, it is always possible to think of equilibria in which subsets
of communities have identical characteristics, i.e. (ti, pi) = (tj, pj) for some j, i.
However, these equilibria may not be stable.7 The focus of this paper is on the
empirically interesting case of equilibria where all communities exhibit distinct
characteristics.
The following paragraphs describe how the utility maximizing households will
be allocated across communities.
Lemma 1 (Boundary indifference)
Consider the subpopulation with taste α. If a household with income y′ prefers to
live in community j and another household with income y′′ > y′ prefers to live in
community i, then there is a ’border’ household with income yˆji(α), y
′ ≤ yˆji(α) ≤
y′′, which is indifferent between the two communities.
Proof: The household with income y′ prefers j to i, hence Vj(y
′) − Vi(y
′) ≥ 0.
The opposite is true for a household with income y′′ thus Vj(y
′′) − Vi(y
′′) ≤ 0.
Vj(y)− Vi(y) is continuous in y as V is continuous in y. The intermediate value
theorem implies that there is at least one yˆji between y
′ and y′′ s.t. Vj(yˆji) −
Vi(yˆji) = 0. The existence of yˆji follows from f(y, α) > 0. 2
7The notion of ‘stability’ in an intrinsically static model is rather peculiar. Nevertheless,
equilibria in static multi-community models are often judged by their ‘dynamic’ behavior. In
this ad-hoc interpretation, an equilibrium is called ‘stable’ when the change of community
characteristics induced by the migration of ‘few’ households gives these households an incentive
to move back.
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The set of ’border’ households is described by the function yˆji(α). Equiva-
lently, the set of border households is given by the inverse function αˆji(y), im-
plicitly defined by Vj(αˆji(y)) = Vi(y, αˆji(y)).
Definition 1 (Conditional income segregation)
An allocation of households is called conditionally segregated by incomes if the J
sets Ij = {y : household with income y and taste α prefers community j} satisfy
• Ij is an interval for all j,
• Ij ∩ Ii = Ø for all i 6= j,
• I1 ∪ ... ∪ IJ = [y, y]
for any α and for any j: Ij 6= Ø for at least one α.
Definition 1 means that in a subpopulation with equal tastes any community is
populated by a single and distinct income class.
Proposition 1 (Conditional income segregation)
When the household preferences are described by a Stone-Geary utility function
and all J communities exhibit distinct characteristics, (tj, pj, gj) 6= (ti, pi, gi) for
all i 6= j, then the allocation of households is conditionally segregated by incomes.
Proof: The proof uses the fact that the utility difference Vj−Vi = V (tj, pj, gj; y, α)−
V (ti, pi, gi; y, α) between community j and i is strictly monotonic in y (see the
Appendix):
sign
∂Vj − Vi
∂y
= sign(
pjβh + βb
1− tj
−
piβh + βb
1− ti
).
Consider three households with income y′ < y′′ < y′′′ respectively and suppose
that the communities are not formed of non-overlapping intervals: y′ as well as
y′′′ prefer community j, but y′′ strictly prefers community i. Given the opposed
preference of y′ and y′′′ it follows from Lemma 1 that there is an indifferent
household yˆ, y′ ≤ yˆ < y′′. The above sign condition implies that all households
richer than yˆ, e.g. y′′′ , also prefer i, which is a contradiction. 2
Schmidheiny (2002) shows that the Properties 1, 2a to 3a are sufficient con-
ditions for income segregation.
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Definition 2 (Conditional taste segregation)
An allocation of households is called conditionally segregated by tastes if the J
sets Ij = {α : household with income y and taste α prefers community j} satisfy
• Ij is an interval for all j,
• Ij ∩ Ij = Ø, for all i 6= j,
• I1 ∪ ... ∪ IJ = [0, 1]
for any y and for any j: Ij 6= Ø for at least one y.
Definition 2 means that in a subpopulation with equal incomes any community
is populated by a single and distinct interval of tastes.
Proposition 2 (Conditional taste segregation)
When the household preferences are described by a Stone-Geary utility function
and all J communities exhibit distinct characteristics, (tj, pj, gj) 6= (ti, pi, gi) for
all i 6= j, then the allocation of households is conditionally segregated by tastes.
Households in communities with lower housing prices have stronger tastes for
housing than households in communities with higher prices.
Proof: The proof of the first sentence is analogous to Proposition 1 using the
sign condition (derived in the appendix) sign(∂(dVj − dVi)/∂α) = sign(pi − pj).
Second sentence: Consider pi < pj and a household (yˆ, αˆ) which is indifferent
between the two communities j and i, hence Vj(yˆ, αˆ) = Vi(yˆ, αˆ). Then any
household with the same income y and taste parameter α > αˆ prefers community
i, i.e. Vj(yˆ, αˆ) < Vi(yˆ, αˆ), since ∂(dVj − dVi)/∂α < 0 if pi < pj. 2
Schmidheiny (2002) shows that the Properties 1, 2b to 3b are sufficient con-
ditions for segregation by tastes.
Propositions 1 and 2 offer two ways of calculating a community’s population:
nj =
∫ 1
0
∫ yj(α)
y
j
(α)
f(y, α) dy dα =
∫ y
y
∫ αj(y)
αj(y)
f(y, α) dα dy,
where y
j
(α) and yj(α) are the lowest and highest income in community j given
the subpopulation with taste α. y
j
(α) is given by the locus of indifferent house-
holds yˆji between community j and its ’adjacent’ community i with lower income
households. The other boundaries yj(α), αj(y) and yj(α) are given analogously.
Note that the adjacent community might not be the same for all subpopulations.
This is demonstrated in Figure 2 showing four examples of possible segregation
patterns in the case of three populated communities.
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Figure 2: Examples of segregation patterns in the three-community case. The
areas denoted by ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ show the attributes of the households that prefer
community 1, 2 or 3 respectively.
2.3 Housing market
Within each community housing is produced from land and non-land factors.
The housing supply in each community j is an increasing function of the housing
price pj and the land dedicated to housing Lj. The housing supply function
HSj = Lj · p
θ
j
is adopted from Epple and Romer (1991), who derive the supply function from
an explicit production function, where θ is the ratio of non-land to land input.
The aggregate housing demand in community j is
HDj =
∫ 1
0
∫ yj(α)
y
j
(α)
h(tj, pj, gj; y, α)f(y, α) dy dα.
In equilibrium, the price for housing in community j clears the housing market
HDj = HSj. (2)
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Definition 3 (Housing market tightness)
The housing market in community j with given population is called not too tight
if
dpj
d(1− tj)
1− tj
pj
∣∣
HDj=HSj
< 1 .
Definition 3 defines the housing market as not too tight if the reaction of
housing prices to changes in the tax rate and hence in the disposable income of
the population is moderate. Note that the reaction of the housing price depends
not only on the housing supply function but also on the characteristics, i.e. tastes
and incomes, of the local population.
2.4 Public Choice
A community j provides a certain amount of a local public good to all its residents.
The cost of providing this good is an increasing function of the amount provided
gj and the number of inhabitants nj in the community. For simplicity, a linear
function is assumed:
C(gj, nj) = c0 + c1 gj nj ,
where c0 ≥ 0 and c1 > 0. Note that there are no spillovers in the production of
the good across communities. The increasing cost in the number of beneficiaries
means that the good is not a pure public good since there is rivalry in consump-
tion. It is public in the sense that it is publicly provided and that all residents
consume the same amount of the good. One can think of e.g. schools, street
construction and maintenance, city planning activities, etc. A positive constant
c0 implies increasing returns to scale in the production of the public good.
The community finances the publicly provided good by a proportional income
tax. The tax revenue is
Tj =
∫ 1
0
∫ yj(α)
y
j
(α)
tj y f(y, α) dy dα = nj tj Eyj ,
where Eyj is the mean income in community j. In equilibrium, the community’s
budget is balanced:
C(gj, nj) = Tj . (3)
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gj
tj
y~
PCFj
y ′′
y′
Figure 3: Voters’ indifference curves in the (t, g) space.
The tax rate and the amount of public goods are determined in a majority
rule vote by the residents of the community. At this stage, households take the
population of the community as given.
Definition 4 (Public choice frontier PCF)
The public choice frontier PCFj in community j is the set of (pj, gj, tj) triples,
where the pair (gj, tj) satisfies budget balance and pj clears the housing market
given the housing demand with tax rate tj.
Proposition 3 (Segregation of voters)
Consider the subpopulation of households with taste α in community j and assume
that the housing market is not too tight for all (pj, tj) on the PCFj. If a household
y˜j(α) prefers the triple (pj, gj, tj) on the PCFj to all other triples on the PCFj,
then any richer (poorer) household opposes a reduction (increase) in taxes.
Proof: The proof refers to Figure 3. Consider the indifference curves of three
voters with household income y′ < y˜ < y′′ respectively, given the same taste
parameter α. These indifference curves take into account the reaction of the
housing prices to a change in the income tax rates. The straight line is the
PCF in community j. One can verify in the figure that the pivotal voter y˜
prefers the pair (gj, tj) to all other combinations on the PCF. It is shown in the
Appendix that the indifference curve is monotonically increasing in t and that its
derivative w.r.t. t is decreasing in y. Therefore, all richer voters, e.g. y′′, dislike
all (g, t) ∈ PCFj combinations with taxes lower than tj, while all poorer voters,
e.g. y′, dislike higher taxes. 2
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y˜j(α) is called the locus of pivotal voters. It is a decreasing function in α, as
the price reduction induced by higher taxes is more appreciated by households
with a stronger taste for housing. Note that from the perspective of a na¨ıve
voter who ignores the housing market, Proposition 3 holds without the additional
assumption of the housing market tightness.
Definition 5 (Majority rule voting equilibrium)
A triple (pj, gj, tj) on community j’s PCF is called a majority rule voting equi-
librium when no other triple on the PCF is strictly preferred by a majority of
the community’s residents.
As an implication of Proposition 3, a majority rule voting equilibrium in
community j is established when
∫ 1
0
∫ Min(y˜j(α),yj(α))
y
j
(α)
f(y, α) dy dα =
1
2
∫ 1
0
∫ yj(α)
y
j
(α)
f(y, α) dy dα (4)
and the housing market is not too tight.
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium as defined below is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the
two-stage game of residential choice and voting.
Definition 6 (Equilibrium)
A set of community characteristics (pj, gj, tj), j = 1, ..., J , and an allocation of
individual households across communities is an equilibrium if and only if
• all households choose their community to maximise their utility,
• the housing market clears in all communities,
• there is a majority rule voting equilibrium in all communities.
Existence of the equilibrium is proofed by Goodspeed (1986) in a model with
income taxes, taste homogeneity, na¨ıve voters and a uniform income distribu-
tion. Epple, Filimon and Romer (1993) show existence in a model with property
taxes and homogeneous tastes. Unfortunately, as in other models with taste het-
erogeneity (Epple and Platt, 1998), a proof of existence and uniqueness of this
equilibrium could not be established. However, equations (1) to (4) provide the
basis for a computational strategy to numerically find an equilibrium.
15
Figure 4: The Zurich metropolitan area around the lake of Zurich.
3 Numerical Equilibrium
In this section the qualitative and quantitative properties of the model are in-
vestigated in a fully specified model calibrated to the biggest Swiss metropolitan
area.
3.1 Calibration
The area around the city of Zurich forms the biggest Swiss metropolitan area.
The city of Zurich has about 330 thousand inhabitants and is the capital of the
canton (state) of Zurich. The canton of Zurich counts 1.2 Million inhabitants
in 171 individual communities. As described in the introduction, any of these
communities can set an individual level of income taxes.
The analysis is restricted to the city of Zurich and a ring of the most integrated
communities around the center. This ring is formed by all communities in the
canton of Zurich with more than 1/3 of the working population commuting to the
center.8 Figure 4 shows a map with the city of Zurich and the thus defined ring
of 40 communities. The community characteristics of this area are also discussed
in the introduction (see Figure 1).
The whole area has a physical size of 349km2, of which 88km2 (25%) form
8The number of commuters to the city of Zurich and the size of the working population in
the communities is based on the 1990 Census.
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the city of Zurich. 140km2 are dedicated to development, 53km2 (38%) in the
inner city and 87km2 in the fringe communities. In 1998, the whole area was
populated by around 628’000 inhabitants, of whom 334’000 lived in the city
and 294’000 in the fringe communities.9 This agglomeration is modelled as two
distinct jurisdictions with land size L1 = 0.4 and L2 = 0.6 respectively.
In the year 1997, the communal tax level in the fringe communities was on
average 19% (minimum -35%, maximum +1%) lower than in the inner city.10
The rental price for housing in the periphery was on average 6% lower than in
the center (minimum -24%, maximum +13%).11 The lowest-tax communities
south-east of the city center exhibit substantially higher housing prices than the
center. Figure 1 visualizes the spatial distribution of tax rates, incomes and
housing prices in the area.
The income distribution is calibrated with data from the Swiss labor force
survey.12 The 1995 cross-section contains detailed information on 1124 house-
holds in the above defined region. These households had an average income of
CHF 92,000 (median CHF 66,700) after state and federal taxes.13 A log-normal
distribution truncated at a minimum and a maximum income level is used to
approximate the income distribution. A mean of E(ln y) = 11.1 and a standard
deviation of SD(ln y) = 0.55 are close to the observed median and quartile dis-
tance. The minimum income is assumed to be ymin = 23, 000 and the maximum
income ymax = 500, 000.
14 The median income in the city of Zurich is CHF 58,700
opposed to CHF 75,200 in the fringe communities.
The distribution of the taste parameter is described by a beta distribution.
The Swiss labor force survey also contains the monthly housing expenditure of
renters which allows to calibrate the distribution of tastes.15 If the housing de-
9Source: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Zu¨rich, Gemeindedaten per 31.12.1998.
10Source: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Zu¨rich, Steuerfu¨sse 1997.
11Source: Wu¨est und Partner, Zurich. Offer prices for flats in newspapers and in the internet
in 1997.
12Swiss Federal Statistical Office, Schweizerische Arbeitskra¨fterhebung (SAKE) 1995.
13State and Federal taxes were deducted from net household income (after social security
contribution) assuming a two-child family.
14The minimum income is subsistence level for a one-person-household as defined by the
Schweizerische Konferenz fu¨r Sozialhilfe (SKOS) and adjusted for inflation. The maximum
income is chosen arbitrarily, but has no influence on the numerical simulation due to the low
weight on high incomes.
15Of course, there is a selection bias by only considering renters. Because the proportion of
renters is very high in Switzerland (65% in the data set used), this is justified.
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mand function is correctly specified, the taste parameter α of a household with
disposable income yd can be calculated as (ph − phmin)/(yd − yd,min), where ph
is expenditure on housing and phmin is the housing expenditure of the household
with minimal disposable income yd,min. The disposable income of a household yd
is calculated as reported household income minus federal, state and communal
taxes. The average yearly housing expenditure of households around subsistence
level is taken to approximate phmin. This enables to approximate each house-
hold’s taste parameter α. A beta distribution with mean E(α) = 0.17 and
standard deviation SD(α) = 0.11 describes the distribution of the so calculated
taste parameter fairly well. Taste and income are assumed to be uncorrelated.
The price elasticity of housing supply is θ = 3 as in Epple and Romer (1991)
and Goodspeed (1989). The production of the public good exhibits constant
returns to scale, i.e. c0 = 0 and c1 = 1. βh = 700, βb = 13000 are chosen such
that the consumption bundle of the minimal income household in equilibrium
corresponds to the empirical findings. It is assumed that the existential needs
for the public good are fairly high and that the benefit from additional units is
limited: βg = 4000 and γ = 0.02.
16 The assumed parameters result in equilibrium
tax rates close to the observed ones. The parameters are summarized at the
bottom of Table 1.
3.2 Simulation Results
The equilibrium values pj, gj and tj, i = 1, 2, must satisfy equations (2), (3)
and (4) and guarantee that the households reside in the community they prefer
as expressed in equation (1). Unfortunately, there is no closed form solution to
this nonlinear system of 6 equations and 6 unknowns. The equation system is
therefore numerically solved for the equilibrium values of the model.17
16The properties of the equilibrium depends decisively on the preference parameters of the
public good. The assumption that the existential need is small but the benefit from additional
units is important can lead to numerical equilibria in which the high-tax communities exhibit
higher housing prices but lower public goods provision. The rich households will then prefer
the high-tax communities. This situation is in clear contradiction to the observed pattern in
Swiss metropolitan areas.
17Numerically solving the equation system is tedious and time-consuming. The aggregation
of individual demand and voting behavior requires double integrals over the community pop-
ulation. These integrals cannot be calculated analytically. Gauss-Legendre Quadrature with
40 nodes in each dimension is used to approximate the various double integrals. Numerically
minimizing the sum of squared deviations from the equilibrium conditions with the Gauss-
Newton method solves for the equilibrium values. Appropriate scaling of the arguments and
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Table 1: Equilibrium values of the simulation.
heterogen. tastes homogen. tastes
unified center periphery center periphery
L: land size 1 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.60
p: housing price 11.40 10.48 11.92 9.19 12.37
t: income tax rate 0.064 0.085 0.059 0.110 0.056
g: public good prov. 5032 4488 5225 4335 5390
n: inhabitants 1 0.284 0.716 0.314 0.686
Ey: average income 78,547 52,995 88,687 39,368 96,460
Average CV 50.9 84.4 41.8 455.9
n (CV> 0) 0.171 0.506 0.180 0.686
The model parameters are: βh = 700, βb = 13000, βg = 4000, γ = 0.02, E(α) = 0.17,
SD(α) = 0.11 (heterogeneous tastes), SD(α) = 0 (homogeneous tastes), E(ln y) = 11.1,
SD(ln y) = 0.55, ymin = 23
′000, ymax = 500
′000, θ = 3, c0 = 0 and c1 = 1.
Table 1 shows the equilibrium values for the calibrated model in columns 2
and 3. The equilibrium values for the case of a unified jurisdiction and for the case
of taste homogeneity are given for comparison. As can be seen, the equilibrium
values of the two communities differ substantially. I will refer to the high-tax
community 1 as the ’center’ and the low-tax community 2 as the ’periphery’.18
The tax rate t1 in the center is 44% higher than in the suburbs, whereas the
housing price is 12% and the public provision 14% lower. The average household
income in the center is CHF 53 thousand a year compared to CHF 89 thousand
in the suburbs. Thus, the simulated model is able to explain tax and income
differences of the magnitude observed in the Zurich area. Not surprisingly, the
model is very poor at explaining the high housing prices in the center as any
immanent center advantages such as closeness to the main business and cultural
activities are neglected.
The segregation of the population in the two communities is shown in the
left picture in Figure 5. The locus of indifferent households, yˆ12, turns out to
of the equilibrium conditions is important for the accuracy of the result. Convergence is only
achieved with ’good’ starting values. Starting values are obtained from a grid search over the
six-dimensional space of possible values. Different starting values lead to the same equilibrium
values.
18These labels are arbitrary. There is always a second equilibrium with lower taxes in com-
munity 1. If the two communities have the same physical size, these two equilibria are identical
except for the community index.
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Figure 5: Income and taste segregation in equilibrium. The left figure includes
the loci of pivotal voters. The right figure shows contour lines of the compensating
variation (CV).
be an increasing function of income in the present equilibrium. This implies
that, given a subpopulation with equal tastes, richer households prefer the low-
tax-high-price community.19 However, this does not lead to a perfect income
segregation between the two communities since the households have different
preferences. Although the average income in the center is much lower than in
the periphery, households from almost all income groups can be found in both
communities. Figure 6 presents the resulting income distributions in the two
communities. Figure 5 also shows the loci of pivotal voters which split the com-
munities’ populations into half. Households in the ’rich’ suburbs vote for more
public goods than households in the ’poor’ center, yet this generous public good
provision can be financed by a lower tax rate, due to the higher average income
of the residents.
The above segregated equilibrium is now compared to the equilibrium when
the two jurisdictions were unified. The latter is equivalent to the equilibrium that
would emerge if the two distinct jurisdictions harmonized their income tax levels
and households located randomly. The equilibrium values of the unified commu-
nity are presented in column 1 in Table 1. One can immediately see that the
housing price, tax level and public good provision lie between the corresponding
19Note that all households with a very high taste for housing prefer to live in the low-
price community. This, however, applies to only 5% of the population, as the weight on taste
parameters above 0.38 is low.
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Figure 6: Income distribution in the center and the periphery.
values in the two-community model. The competition of the two communities for
households does thus not lead to an overall reduction of taxes, but to relatively
lower taxes in the ’rich’ community and higher taxes in the ’poor’ community.
The welfare effects associated with the segregated equilibrium depend on both
the households’ incomes and tastes.
The welfare effects are revealed by inspecting the compensating variation (CV)
for the different types of households. The compensating variation is the additional
gross income that a households needs in order to be compensated for a shift from
the symmetric to the segregated equilibrium.20 The right picture in Figure 5
shows contour lines of the CV. Households in the shaded band between the two
zero contour lines exhibit positive values of the CV and thus prefer the one-
community situation. Households further away from the border household prefer
competing jurisdictions. The average CV’s are reported in Table 1. Households
in the ’poor’ community have to be compensated by an average income allowance
of CHF 51 compared to CHF 84 in the ’rich’ community. Note that this amount
is only one-tenth of a percent of average gross income. The number of households
that prefer tax harmonization is also given in Table 1. 60% of the population in
the ’poor’ community and 71% of the population in the ’rich’ community prefer
tax harmonization.
How does the taste heterogeneity affects the properties of the equilibrium?
20The CV defined above is not a comprehensive measure of the welfare implications since it
ignores the welfare implications for the (absentee) landlord. The analytical solution for the CV
given household characteristics is given in the Appendix.
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Figure 7: Equilibria with changing standard deviation of taste parameter.
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Figure 8: Equilibria with changing relative size of the communities.
The last two columns in Table 1 give the equilibrium values in the case of constant
tastes that equal the average heterogeneous tastes. This equilibrium features
perfect income segregation. Consequently, the income difference between the
two communities is much larger than with heterogeneous tastes. Also, the price,
tax and public good provision differences across the communities are stronger.
The equilibrium values in a unified community equal the ones with taste homo-
geneity.21 The welfare effects under the assumption of taste homogeneity are
substantially greater than under heterogeneity.
21The symmetric equilibrium in the case of taste homogeneity is theoretically different from
the one in the case of taste heterogeneity as the pivotal voter varies with the taste parameter.
However, this difference is numerically negligible if the constant taste parameter equals the
mean of the heterogeneous tastes.
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Figure 7 shows the equilibrium values for different levels of taste heterogeneity
measured by the standard deviation SD(α), leaving the mean of tastes constant.
The horizontal axes cover a range from SD(α) = 0 (taste homogeneity) to a max-
imum SD(α) = 0.14322 including the calibrated case SD(α) = 0.11. The picture
reveals that the equilibrium converges towards the values of the symmetric case,
indicated by the dotted lines. This is explained by the fact that with increasing
taste variance, the population is more and more segregated by taste rather than
income. This result suggests that taste heterogeneity is able to lower the negative
distributional effects of decentralized tax authority. Figure 7 (far right) shows
the corresponding change of the average compensating variation. While the av-
erage CV in the poor center community is almost unaffected by the amount of
taste heterogeneity in the population, it falls sharply in the rich periphery. The
fraction of households in the periphery which would prefer harmonized taxes falls
accordingly from 100% (SD(α) = 0) to 65% (SD(α) = 0.143).
Up to now, the physical land size was given by the calibration. However,
the relative size of the two jurisdictions is likely to influence the equilibrium val-
ues and is therefore investigated in detail. The influence of the relative land
size is reported in Figure 8. The housing price and the public good provision
in both communities increase with the physical size of the center community
(community 1). Recall that the high-tax community is called the center by con-
vention. The low-tax community shows lower public good provision and lower
housing prices than the low-tax community throughout all possible partitions of
land between the two communities. Furthermore, the average income in the low-
price community is always lower than in the high-price community. The order of
community characteristics is hence not affected by the relative land size. Not sur-
prisingly, the equilibrium values of a community that virtually covers the whole
area (L1 = 1 or L1 = 0, hence L2 = 1) equal the values of one unified community,
marked by the dotted lines. The equilibrium values in the remaining very small
community differ maximally from the values in the case of unified communities.
The tax rate in the rich community 2 declines with increasing relative land size
in community 1. This shows that the rich community’s ability to set low taxes is
higher when it is physically small.
22Given the mean Eα = 0.17, SD(α) = 0.143 is the maximal standard deviation that pre-
serves the bell-shaped form of the beta distribution. Higher values lead to a u-shaped distribu-
tion.
23
The influence of the relative land size on welfare is particularly interesting.
Recall that in the calibrated situation (L1 = 0.4), the average household prefers
harmonized taxes: average CV is CHF 51 in the center and CHF 84 in the
periphery. This result does strongly depend on the relative community size as
can be seen in Figure 8 (far right). The average CV in the poor center community
is negative if this community is small (L1 < 0.3), meaning that the population
in the center does on average prefer (higher) local taxes to (lower) harmonized
taxes, as they are associated with lower housing prices.23 Note that it is the
poorer part of the population in the poor community that profits most from the
local differences. The rich periphery shows a similar picture. Its increased ability
to set low taxes when it is small (L2 < 0.27) leads to a negative average CV, i.e.
an average preference for local taxation.24 Note that it is the richer part of the
population that profits most from the decentralized tax setting.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a model of an urban area with local income taxes used to
finance a local public good. The main assumptions of the model are the following:
Households differ in income and taste for housing. The demand for housing and
private goods is a linear demand system. The share of housing in the budget
of the households is on average declining. The private good can only partly
substitute for the publicly provided good.
The existence of a segregated equilibrium is shown in a calibrated two-commu-
nity model assuming realistic single-peaked distributions for income and taste in
housing. The high-tax community shows both lower housing prices and lower
public good provision than the low-tax community. The equilibrium features
segregation of households by both income and tastes. The emerging segregation
pattern is such that rich households prefer the low-tax-high-price community
given a subpopulation with equal tastes. As tastes differ across households, this
does not lead to a perfect income segregation of the population but to an income
distribution in the ’rich’ low-tax community that stochastically dominates the
income distribution in the ’poor’ high-tax community. The model is able to
23The majority of households in the center prefer decentralized tax setting when L1 < 0.26.
24When the rich community is even smaller (L2 < 0.11), the supporters of local taxation is
on the majority.
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explain the substantial differences of the local income tax level and of average
income across communities as observed in Switzerland.
The numerical investigation suggests that taste heterogeneity reduces the dis-
tributional effects of local tax differences. The differences of characteristics across
communities are maximal when tastes are equal for all households and the popu-
lation is accordingly perfectly segregated by incomes. These differences decrease
with increasing taste heterogeneity as the income segregation of the population
becomes more and more diffuse.
The numerical investigation also suggests that the relative size of the individ-
ual jurisdictions has great impact on the equilibrium situation. The characteris-
tics of a relatively large community are close to the equilibrium characteristics of
a single jurisdiction that covers the whole area. Conversely, the relatively small
community differs substantially from the single jurisdiction. The ability of the
rich community to set low taxes, for example, is higher when this community
is physically small. However, contrary to the findings by Hansen and Kessler
(2001a), a tax haven need not be small.
Multi-community models are especially well-suited to study metropolitan ar-
eas as it is assumed that the residence choice of a household is made after and
independent of the decision of where its members work. This assumption does
not seem justifiable on the level of federal states or even countries. Therefore, the
results presented in this paper may only be indicative for the analysis of fiscal
federalism on the level of states or countries.
From an empirical perspective, a weakness of the model is its poor explanatory
power for the typically observed high housing prices in the highly taxed center of
Swiss metropolitan areas. This is due to neglect of the advantages of the central
business (and cultural) district for households. The incorporation of distance
between residence and business or other activities – hence the incorporation of
geography – is an interesting task for future research.
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Appendix
The household problem is
max
h,b
U(h, b, g, α) = α ln(h− βh) + (1− α) ln(b− βb) + γ ln(g − βg)
s.t. ph+ b ≤ y(1− t) .
This leads to the housing demand
h∗ = h(t, p, y, α) =
α[y(1− t)− pβh − βb]
p
+ βh ,
the income elasticity of housing
ε =
∂h∗
∂y(1− t)
y(1− t)
h∗
=
αy(1− t)
α[y(1− t)− pβh − βb] + pβh
and the indirect utility function
V = α ln(α) + (1− α) ln(1− α)− α ln(p) + ln[y(1− t)− pβh − βb] + γ ln(g − βg) .
The marginal rates of substitution in Property 1 are derived by totally differen-
tiating the indirect utility function:
Mg,t = −
∂V/∂t
∂V/∂g
=
y(g − βg)
γ[y(1− t)− pβh − βb]
,
Mg,p = −
∂V/∂p
∂V/∂g
=
h∗(g − βg)
γ[y(1− t)− pβh − βb]
,
Mt,p = −
∂V/∂p
∂V/∂t
= −
h∗
y
.
Differentiation of the MRS w.r.t. income and taste yields Property 2:
∂Mg,t
∂y
= −
(g − βg)(pβh + βb)
γ[y(1− t)− pβh − βb]2
,
∂Mg,t
∂α
= 0 ,
∂Mg,p
∂y
= −
(1− t)(g − βg)βh
γ[y(1− t)− pβh − βb]2
,
∂Mg,p
∂α
=
g − βg
pγ
,
∂Mt,p
∂y
=
(1− α)pβh − αβb
py2
,
∂Mt,p
∂α
= −
y(1− t)− pβh − βb
py
.
The independence of the MRS ratio in Property 3 follows directly:
∂Mg,p
∂y
/
∂Mg,t
∂y
=
(1− t)βh
pβh + βb
,
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∂Mt,p
∂y
/
∂Mt,g
∂y
=
[(1− α)pβh − αβb](g − βg)
γp(pβh + βb)
,
where Mt,g = 1/Mg,t.
The locus of indifferent households between community j and i
yˆji(α) =
(pj βh + βb) pi
α (gj − βg)
γ − (βb + pi βh) pj
α (gi − βg)
γ
(1− tj) piα (gj − βg)
γ − (1− ti) pjα (gi − βg)
γ .
solves V (tj, pj, gj, y, α) = V (ti, pi, gi, y, α) for y. Alternatively, the locus solves
for α:
αˆji(y) =
ln[
y(1−tj)−pjβh−βb
y(1−ti)−piβh−βb
] + γ ln[
gj−βg
gi−βg
]
ln(pj/pi)
.
The locus αˆji(y) is either strictly increasing and concave in y or strictly decreasing
and convex, as can easily be verified by inspecting the first and second derivative
∂αˆji
∂y
= −
(1− tj)[piβh − βb]− (1− ti)[pjβh − βb]
[y(1− tj)− pjβh − βb][y(1− ti)− piβh − βb] ln(pj/pi)
∂2αˆji
∂y2
= −
∂αˆji
∂y
·
(1− tj)[y(1− ti)− piβh − βb] + (1− ti)[y(1− tj)− pjβh − βb]
[y(1− tj)− pjβh − βb][y(1− ti)− piβh − βb]
and provided that all household reach the subsistence level, i.e. y(1 − t) >
pβh + βb > 0, in both communities.
The utility difference between community j and i is
Vj(y, α)− Vi(y, α) = −α ln(
pj
pi
) + ln[
y(1− tj)− pjβh − βb
y(1− ti)− piβh − βb
] + γ ln(
gj − βb
gi − βb
).
Differentiation of the above expression w.r.t. y and α is used in the proof of
Propositions 1 and 2:
∂(Vj − Vi)
∂y
=
1
y −
pjβh+βb
1−tj
−
1
y − piβh+βb
1−ti
,
∂(Vj − Vi)
∂α
= ln(pi)− ln(pj).
The rate of substitution between tax rate and public good provision a voter faces
is derived from totally differentiating the indirect utility function considering the
housing market reaction, dp/dt|HD=HS (community subscripts ommited):
dg
dt
∣∣∣∣
dV=0,HD=HS
=
−∂V
∂t
− ∂V
∂p
· dp
dt
∣∣
HD=HS
∂V
∂g
= Mgt +Mgp ·
dp
dt
∣∣∣∣
HD=HS
=
g − βg
γ[y(1− t)− pβh − βb]
[
y + h∗
dp
dt
∣∣∣∣
HD=HS
]
.
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The voter’s rate of substitution is positive when the price effect on the housing
market is not too large:
dg
dt
∣∣∣∣
dV=0,HD=HS
> 0 iff
dp/p
d(1− t)/(1− t)
∣∣∣∣
HD=HS
<
y(1− t)
ph∗
.
The voter’s rate of substitution decreases with income
∂ dg
dt
∣∣
dV=0,HD=HS
∂y
=
∂Mg,t
∂y
+
∂Mg,p
∂y
dp
dt
∣∣∣∣
HD=HS
.
= −
g − βg
γ[y(1− t)− pβh − βb]2
[
pβh + βb + (1− t)βh
dp
dt
∣∣∣∣
HD=HS
]
if the price effect on the housing market is not too large:
∂ dg
dt
∣∣
dV=0,HD=HS
∂y
< 0 iff
dp/p
d(1− t)/(1− t)
∣∣∣∣
HD=HS
<
pβh + βb
pβh
.
Both the condition on the sign of the voter’s marginal rate of substitution and the
sign of its derivative w.r.t. y are fulfilled if dp/p
d(1−t)/(1−t)
∣∣
HD=HS
< 1 (see Definition 3)
and all households reach the subsistence level.
The compensating variation cvj is the additional gross income that a household
in e.g. community j needs in order to be compensated for a shift from the sym-
metric (unified) equilibrium, (tu, pu, gu), to the segregated equilibrium, (tj, pj, gj).
Solving
V (tu, pu, gu; y, α) = V (tj, pj, gj; y + cv, α)
for cv yields the compensating variation for a household with income y and taste
α in community j:
cvj(y, α) =
[y(1− tu)− βb − puβh](
pu
pj
)−α(gu−βg
gj−βg
)γ − [y(1− tj)− βb − pjβh]
1− tj
.
The average compensating variation in community j is then computed as
CVj =
1
nj
∫ 1
0
∫ yj(α)
y
j
(α)
cvj(y, α) f(y, α) dy dα .
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